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Genetic relatedness is a key driver of the evolution of cooperation. One
mechanism that may ensure social partners are genetically related is kin
discrimination, in which individuals are able to distinguish kin from non-kin
and adjust their behaviour accordingly. However, the impact of kin discrim-
ination upon the overall level of cooperation remains obscure. Specifically,
while kin discrimination allows an individual to help more-related social
partners over less-related social partners, it is unclear whether and how the
population average level of cooperation that is evolutionarily favoured
should differ under kin discrimination versus indiscriminate social behaviour.
Here, we perform a general mathematical analysis in order to assess whether,
when and in which direction kin discrimination changes the average level of
cooperation in an evolving population. We find that kin discrimination may
increase, decrease or leave unchanged the average level of cooperation, depend-
ing uponwhether the optimal level of cooperation is a convex, concave or linear
function of genetic relatedness. We develop an extension of the classic ‘tragedy
of the commons’ model of cooperation in order to provide an illustration of
these results. Our analysis provides a method to guide future research on the
evolutionary consequences of kin discrimination.1. Introduction
Genetic relatedness is a key concept in the theoryof kin selection [1–3]. In order for
cooperation—or, indeed, any trait—to be favoured by kin selection, individuals
must be able to interact with genetically related social partners. Three basic mech-
anisms may lead to social partners being genetically related [4]: (i) population
viscosity, in which limited dispersal of individuals during their lifetimes ensures
that even indiscriminate social interaction among neighbours is likely to be occur-
ring between kin [1,2]; (ii) kin discrimination, by which individuals distinguish
their genealogical relatives from unrelated individuals using genetic or environ-
mental cues [1,2]; and (iii) the greenbeard effect, whereby genes can identify
the presence of copies of themselves in other individuals, ascertaining genetic
relatedness at this locus directly and irrespective of genealogical relationship
[2,5,6]. Accordingly, kin discrimination is the key to classic nepotistic behaviour,
in which individuals give preferential treatment to their genealogically close kin.
However, it is not clear whether and in what way kin discrimination should
affect the overall level of cooperation within a population. Specifically, while
kin discriminationwould allowan individual to helpmore-related social partners
over less-related social partners, it is unclear how the population average level of
cooperation that is evolutionarily favoured should differ under kin discrimination
versus indiscriminate social behaviour. Insofar as this issue has been raisedwithin
the kin-selection literature, the conventional view appears to be that individuals
operating under a ‘veil of ignorance’ [7,8] with regard to their genetic relatedness
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsbl
Biol.Lett.16:2019
2to their social partners will tend to be favoured to behave more
cooperatively than they would do were they able to behave
nepotistically [9–11]. However, no formal analysis of this
general problem has previously been undertaken, so it remains
unclear whether this view is accurate and exactly what would
drive this cooperation-promoting effect of ignorance.
Here, we perform a general analysis of the evolution of
cooperation in order to assess whether, in what way and why
the population average level of cooperation is modulated by
the ability to behave nepotistically versus indiscriminately
with regards to social behaviour.We then develop an extension
of the classic ‘tragedyof the commons’model of the evolutionof
cooperation [12,13], which mathematically captures the tension
between individual selfishness and group success, to illustrate
the results of our general analysis in more concrete terms.
We end by discussing the implications of our results for future
theoretical and empirical research, focusing on the utility
of our method in analysing the evolutionary consequences of
lifting the veil of ignorance in a social population.07422. General analysis
We assume an infinite population separated into discrete
groups within which individuals engage in public-goods
cooperation. Let individual fitness be given by w=W(x, y, z),
where x is the individual’s own genetic ‘breeding’ value for
investment into cooperation, y is the average genetic value
across this individual’s social partners and z is the average gen-
etic value across the whole population. An increase in the
average level of cooperation is favoured by natural selection
when (dw/dx)|x=y=z>0, i.e. when Hamilton’s rule −c(z) +
b(z)r>0 is satisfied, where −c(z) = (∂w/∂x)|x=y=z, b(z) = (∂w/
∂y)|x=y=z and r=dy/dx is the kin-selection coefficient of related-
ness [1,2,14,15]. Accordingly, assuming that an intermediate
evolutionarily stable strategy [16] exists, this ‘optimal’ level of
investment into cooperation z* =Z(r) satisfies −c(z*) + b(z*)r=0,
as this is a necessary condition for evolutionary stability
[17,18]. Note that while the marginal fitness effect −c(z) + b(z)r
of an increase in cooperation is a linear function of relatedness
r, the optimal level of investment z* need not be.
This optimum pertains to situations in which public-goods
cooperation is governed by a single genetic trait, i.e. when there
is only one contextwithinwhich cooperation is performed, or if
individuals are unable to adjust their level of cooperation
according to context. If instead cooperation is performed in
multiple contexts, and individuals are able to adjust their
level of cooperation according to the optimum for each context
separately, then a separate genetic trait must be considered for
each of these different contexts. An example of this is when
there is variation in relatedness between social groups and
individuals are able to judge how related they are to their
social partners and respond to this conditional information
by adjusting their level of cooperation. Here, the condition
for natural selection to favour an increase in cooperation in
relatedness context i is −c(z) + b(z)ri > 0, where ri is the genetic
relatedness pertaining to this particular context, and the opti-
mal level of cooperation for this context is given by zi* =Z(ri)
which satisfies −c(z) + b(z)ri = 0.
In this case, the average level of cooperation across the
population is given by z ¼ Pi pizi ¼ Pi piZ(ri), where pi
denotes the proportion of individuals experiencing relatedness
ri. It follows that, if Z is a linear function of its argument, then∑ipiZ(ri) =Z(∑ipiri) =Z(r), and hence z ¼ z, i.e. in this linear
case the average level of cooperation across the population is
exactly the same irrespective of whether individuals adjust
their level of cooperation in light of kin discrimination versus
expressing the same level of cooperation in all kinship contexts.
By contrast, if Z is a nonlinear function of its argument,
then the average level of cooperation across the population
may depend on whether individuals respond facultatively
to kinship information. In particular: if Z is a convex func-
tion of its argument, then, from Jensen’s [19] inequality, we
have ∑ipiZ(ri)≥Z(∑ipiri), such that z  z, i.e. the popula-
tion average level of cooperation may be larger when
individuals recognize and respond to kinship versus behave
indiscriminately; and if Z is a concave function of its argu-
ment, then ∑ipiZ(ri)≤Z(∑ipiri), such that z  z, i.e. the
population average level of cooperation may be lower
when individuals recognize and respond to kinship versus
behave indiscriminately.3. An illustration
We now provide a concrete illustration of the general predic-
tions made above using a development of the classic ‘tragedy
of the commons’ model of the evolution of cooperation
[12,13]. We continue to consider an infinite population sub-
divided into social groups, with each group having the
same amount of resource at its disposal. We now assume
that in a proportion q of social groups the average relatedness
of the constituent individuals is rlow, and in a proportion 1− q
of social groups the average relatedness is rhigh. Without any
loss of generality, we assume rlow≤ rhigh, such that we may
refer to the first type of group as low-relatedness groups
and the second type of group as high-relatedness groups.
We denote an individual’s level of cooperation if finding her-
self in a low-relatedness group as xlow and her level of
cooperation if finding herself in a high-relatedness group as
xhigh, and we denote the overall level of cooperation in her
group as ylow in the low-relatedness setting and as yhigh in
the high-relatedness setting. We assume that the overall
fitness of the social group is proportional to the level of
cooperation exhibited by its constituent members, and that
individuals who behave relatively less cooperatively enjoy a
relatively greater share of their group’s fitness, such that the
focal individual’s fitness is given by
w ¼ q 1 xlow
1 ylow
 b





where b  0 describes the rate of decline in group share of
fitness associated with an increase in relative cooperativeness.
In the absence of kin discrimination—i.e. under the
constraint that xlow = xhigh and ylow= yhigh—we find that the
optimal level of cooperation is given by
z ¼ r
rþ b(1 r) , ð3:2Þ
where r= q rlow+ (1− q) rhigh is the average within-group
relatedness across the population (see electronic supplemen-
tary material for details). Note that this optimum level of
cooperation is of the form z* =Z(r), as derived in the previous
section, and moreover, it is a concave function of relatedness
when 0< β<1, a linear function of relatedness when β= 1






























































Figure 1. Comparison of a tragedy of the commons model when kin discrimination is absent versus when kin discrimination is present. When the candidate
uninvadable investment of cooperation is a concave function of genetic relatedness (a), presence of kin discrimination leads to cooperation average being
lower in the population than when kin discrimination is absent. When the candidate uninvadable investment of cooperation is a linear function of genetic relat-
edness (b), presence or absence of kin discrimination leads to the same cooperation average in the population. Finally, when the candidate uninvadable investment
of cooperation is a convex function of genetic relatedness (c), presence of kin discrimination leads to cooperation average being higher in the population than when
kin discrimination is absent. The following parameter values were used: frequency of different types of patches q= 0.5; relatedness rlow = 0.2; relatedness rhigh = 0.8.




note that this exactly recovers Frank’s [12,13] result for the
special case where β=1: here, the optimal level of cooperation
is z* = r, and hence the optimal level of selfishness is 1− r.
If instead individuals are able to adjust their level of
cooperation according to the level of relatedness that they
detect within their group—i.e. so it is possible that xlow≠
xhigh and ylow≠ yhigh—then we find that the optimal level of
cooperation is given by
zlow¼
rlow
rlow þ b(1 rlow) , ð3:3Þ
for an individual in a low-relatedness group, and by
zhigh¼
rhigh
rhigh þ b(1 rhigh) , ð3:4Þ
for an individual in a high-relatedness group (see electronic
supplementary material for details), and this means that the
overall level of cooperation in the population is given by
z¼ q rlow
rlow þ b(1 rlow)þ (1 q)
rhigh
rhigh þ b(1 rhigh) : ð3:5Þ
Comparison of the overall level of cooperation in the presence
(equation (3.5)) and absence (equation (3.2)) of kin discrimi-
nation recovers the results of our general analysis: (i) kin
discrimination decreases the overall level of cooperation
(z , z) when cooperation is a concave function of relatedness
(0< β<1; figure 1a); (ii) kin discrimination does not affect the
overall level of cooperation (z ¼ z) when cooperation is a
linear function of relatedness (β=1; figure 1b); and (iii) kin dis-
crimination increases the overall level of cooperation (z . z)
when cooperation is a convex function of relatedness (β>1;
figure 1c).4. Discussion
In the social-evolution literature, there has been a tendency
to associate ‘veil-of-ignorance’ scenarios with increased coopera-
tion, such that individuals behave more cooperatively—on
average—when they have less information [9–11]. Here, wehave shown that ignorance concerning the relatedness
of one’s social partners may increase, decrease or leave unaf-
fected the overall level of cooperation that is favoured in an
evolving population, depending on whether the optimal
level of cooperation is a convex, concave or linear function
of relatedness. We have demonstrated this result both in
general terms and also in the context of an illustrative,
‘tragedy-of-the-commons’ setting.
Queller & Strassmann’s [11] discussion of the role of ignor-
ance in the evolution of cooperation is the only treatment, to
our knowledge, that has provided a general prediction as to
how ignorance of relatedness will modulate the overall level of
cooperation. Generalizing across particular contexts—including
conflicts in relation to meiotic drive, parent-of-origin-specific
gene expression and queen–worker conflicts in social-insect
colonies—they suggest that ignorance with respect to related-
ness is a general promoter of cooperation (and their analysis
also considered ignorance with respect to other factors, such as
fitness pay-offs). Our mathematical analysis agrees that this
will be the case provided that the optimal level of cooperation
is generally a concave (i.e. decelerating) function of relatedness,
but suggests that the opposite result will obtain in scenarios
where cooperation is a convex (i.e. accelerating) function of
relatedness. Our analysis provides no basis for believing that
cooperation should be a concave as opposed to the convex func-
tion of relatedness and so, if this does happen to be the case
across the majority of empirical scenarios, further theoretical
and empirical investigation will be required in order to explain
why this should be so.
In order to facilitate comparison between scenarios in
which kin discrimination is present versus absent, we have
assumed that the underlying relatedness structure of a popu-
lation is independent of this aspect of a species’ biology.
However, it is feasible that any impact that kin discrimina-
tion has on the overall level of cooperation could itself
modulate the incidence ( pi) and corresponding relatedness
coefficient (ri) for each of the situations in which individuals
may find themselves, and such changes could further contrib-
ute to differences in the overall level of cooperation that is
evolutionarily favoured. Depending on the details of a species’
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4biology, this complicating effect could either increase or
decrease heterogeneity in the relatedness structure of the popu-
lation, so it is difficult to make general predictions as to the
difference this would make.
Similarly, we have assumed that the cost and benefit func-
tions of cooperation (c and b) are also unchanged, for the sake
of comparison, though in principle these could be modulated
by kin discrimination in a number of ways. Finally, we have
assumed that the personal-fitness effects of a given amount
of cooperation for the actor and recipient are independent of
their relatedness to each other; dependences may arise if, for
example, failure to cooperate is more likely to lead to reprisals
when social partners are less-related [20,21]. In the absence of
reasons for suspecting that such complicating factors will
always modulate cooperation in a particular direction, our
main conclusion that there is no formal basis for supposing
that there is a clear directional link between kin discrimination
and the overall level of cooperation remains unchanged.
Kin discrimination occurs in relation to a variety of
social-evolutionary scenarios, including sexual conflict [22],
cooperation [23], sex allocation [24] and resource competition
[25]. To our knowledge, no empirical study has investigated
how kin discrimination affects the overall level of social behav-
iour, and it is our hope that our analysis will stimulate such
work in the future. Note that this issue is distinct from the ques-
tion of whether and when kin discrimination itself will be
evolutionarily favoured. When inference of relatedness ispossible from environmental or genetical cues, individuals
are expected to kin discriminate provided the cognitive (and
other) costs are not too large and there is sufficient variance
in relatedness for the cues to be informative [26]. However, gen-
etic kin discrimination is only expected to occur in limited
circumstances where there is strong balancing selection
acting to maintain allelic variation at those loci used in the
identification of kin, as otherwise the benefits of being recog-
nized as kin would lead to common alleles increasing in
frequency and rare alleles being lost, such that these become
poor indicators of kinship [27–29].
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